

EARLY WARNING REPORT

Kosovo

- Political and Institutional Stability
- Economic and Social Stability
- Inter-ethnic Relations
- Public and Personal Security
- Decentralization Process and Newly Established Municipalities in Kosovo

Report

October – December 2009

27





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March 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the experts and respondents and do not necessarily represent the views of either UNDP or USAID.

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Decentralization Process and Newly Established Municipalities in Kosovo

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**Your comments and feedback are important for further development of the reports.
Please forward these to: early.warning.ks@undp.org**

Geographic regions of Kosovo



Selected Economic Indicators

	Jan-Mar 2005	Jul-Sep 2005	Jan-Jun 2006	Oct-Dec 2006	Apr-Jun 2007	Nov-Dec 2007	July-Sept 2008	Apr-Jun 2009	Oct-Dec 2009	Trend
Population (in ,000) (a)	1,999*		2,033 **		2.07**	2.1**	2.1**	2.2*	2.2*	◀▶
GDP growth rate (annual), % (a)	0.3		3.0			3.5	3.5	5.4(a)	3.8** (a)	▼
GDP per capita, € (a)	1,120 (a)		1,117 (a)			1,150 (q)	1,150	1,784(a)	1,731**(a)	▼
KCB (Annual), million € (b)	641.5		713.2 (l)		553 (m)		862.13	862.13	895.9 (m)	▲
Workers' remittances, million €	281.0 (a)		318.0 (a)			398	467 (p)	535.8 (q)	535.8 (q)	◀▶
Foreign assistance, million € (a)	462.0 *		465.0 *			352 (r)	275**			
KPST fund, million € (c)	145.8		167.5 (May) (d)	213.0 (Dec) (k)					380.7	▲
PAK fund, million € (e)	113.1 (Dec)		234.9	275.0 (Dec)		399.9 (Nov-Dec 2007)	426.1 (May)		451.0	▲
Bank deposits, million €	704.8	765.8 (Aug)	844.6 (Apr) (e)	926.4 (Dec)	967.6 (Apr)	1.228 (Dec)(s)	1.183 (p) (May)	1.513 (q) (Jun)	1.65 (q) (Sep)	▲
Commercial bank loans, million €	356.5 (Feb)	401.8 (Aug)	459.7 (Apr) (e)	490.5 (Dec)	560.2 (Apr)	891.2 (Dec)(t)	1,052.8 (p) (May)	1,281 (q) (Jun)	1,281 (q) (Sep)	◀▶
Trade balance, million € (j)	-219.1 (Jan-Mar)	-723.4 (Jan-Aug)	-537.5 (Jan-Jun)	-1235.3 (Jan-Dec)	-400 (Jan-Apr)	-264.6 (Nov-Dec) (n)	-142 (May)		-152 (Sep)	▼
Registered job-seekers	303,095 (Jan)	314,446 (Aug)	323,201 (May)	326,026 (Dec)		334,595 (Dec)	336,366 (Mar 2008) (n)	338,618 (May 2009) (q)	339,418 (Sep 2009) (q)	▲
Consumer Price Index, % (compared to May 2002) ***	101.4 (May)	98.5 (Aug)	102.9 (May)	102.6 (Nov)	99.4 (Apr)	102.8 (Dec)	112.8 (Jul)		108.8 (Sep)	▼
Basic pensions (per month), €	40	40	40	40	40	40	40		70	
Voluntary returns		2,126		1,608 (g)						

* Estimated

** Projected

*** In January 2006, SOK changed the methodology for compiling CPI. Therefore the comparison of currently produced CPI with the CPI from before January 2006 is not possible

Sources:

- a) IMF Aide Memoire, (September 2007 and June 2009);
 b) MEF (2006), Budget, MEF, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.
 c) KPST (2009), Annual Report 2009, KPST, Prishtinë/Priština.
 d) Assessment obtained from KPST through e-mail.
 e) Report of the Auditor General, 2009
 f) SOK (2006), Price Statistics Division, Consumer Price Index, SOK, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.
 The rest of the figures are from UNDP (2006), Early Warning Report No. 12: October - December 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.
 g) United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Kosovo.

h) BPK (2006), Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 56, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, August 2006.

i) Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 2006.

j) This is the trade deficit for the period Jan-Feb 2007, Statistical Office of Kosovo

k) This figure is reported at KPST's website, date of release February 7th, 2007

(l) CBAK (2007). Monthly Statistics Bulletin for December 2006. No (64). Prishtina

(m) Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance

(n) Ministry of Public Services of Kosova - Quarterly Bulletin May 2008

(p) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN May 2008

(q) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN

(r) CBAK - Annual Report 2008

Selected Indicators from the Opinion Poll

	Mar 2005	Sep 2005	Jun 2006	Dec 2006	Jun 2007	Dec 2007	Sep 2008	Nov 2008	Jun 2009	Sep 2009	Jan 2010	Trend
	a)	b)	c)	d)	e)	f)	g)	o)	p)	q)	r)	
Political pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current political trends)	38.6	41.0	43.4	48.9	54.0	41.1	36.0	35.73%	26.78%	33.03%	41.08%	▲
Economic pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current economic trends)	71.1	68.8	76.0	76.2	70.7	64.6	53.0	55.0	43.48%	57.07%	60.31%	▲
Willingness to protest due to economic reasons, %	62.9	57.4	62.8	42.8	54.9	71.3	68.3	75.7%	64.32%	66.58%	63.40%	▼
Willingness to protest due to political reasons, %	48.9	45.4	45.5	30.9	31.2	58.6	49.2	59.5%	45.21%	50.68%	46.06%	▼
Satisfaction with UNMIK's performance*, %	29.7	34.5	30.5	28.0	31.5	27.7	25.4	20.8%	28.36%	23.11%	12.58%	▼
Satisfaction with SRSG's performance*, %	81.2	69.8	70.5	43.6	45.9	39.6	18.4	21.1%	33.66%	25.93%	17.79%	▼
Satisfaction with PISG's (now Gov. Kosovo) performance*, %	81.2	48.7	43.3	27.2	35.9		49.9	55.7%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	▼
Satisfaction with Assembly's performance*, %	73.7	59.0	45.4	25.6	31.9	36.7	46.0	49.0%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	▼
Satisfaction with KFOR's performance*, %	81.0	84.3	81.0	77.5	81.8	83.7	84.2	86.9%	72.88%	71.90%	77.63%	▲
Satisfaction with KPS performance *, %	86.9	84.5	81.8	72.5	79.3	78.6	80.0	80.9%	71.14%	70.96%	74.86%	▲
Feelings of insecurity ("Somewhat unsafe" or "very unsafe" while outdoors)	38.1	36.7	35.5	38.6	22.6*	55.25*	21.2	18.3	26.00%	17.87%	27.64%	▲

* includes "satisfied" and "very satisfied" (question was redesigned in June 2007, therefore June results are not comparable to earlier results)

Sources:

- a) UNDP, Early Warning Report March 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.
- b) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2005.
- c) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2006
- d) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2006
- e) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2007
- f) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2007
- g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2008
- o) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2008
- p) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2009
- q) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2009
- r) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jan 2010

List of Acronyms

CPI	Consumer Price Index
EU	European Union
EWR	Early Warning Report
EWS	Early Warning System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KEK	Korporata Energjetike e Kosovës (Energy Corporation of Kosovo)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
RTK	Radio Televizioni i Kosovës (Public TV Broadcaster of Kosovo)
SEE	South-East Europe
SRSB	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Foreword

This is UNDP's twenty-seventh Early Warning Report (EWR #27), a series that commenced in August 2002. We continue to enjoy the sponsorship of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that shares the cost of the EWR. This report covers the period from October to December 2009 and is based on an opinion poll conducted across Kosovo in January 2010. The report follows the tradition of previous reports by examining the evolving situation in Kosovo in four main areas: political, socio-economic, interethnic, and security. A particular feature of the Early Warning System (EWS) Project Phase IV is that every quarterly report will draw from the input and insights of a diverse pool of analysts and professionals that discuss the report's findings in a Focus Group meeting format.

Within the EWS framework, continued monitoring of early warning indicators may prove to be a necessary tool for obtaining insight into potential conflict-causing factors as well as the opinion of Kosovo people on the post-status process and Kosovo's overall development path.

Just like previous EWRs, the EWR #27 includes four main chapters: political and institutional stability, the socio-economic situation, interethnic relations, and personal and public security. In addition, this EWR also includes a special chapter on the decentralization process. The analysis of these issues is primarily based on data from a public opinion survey carried out by UBO Consulting in January 2010. The EWS surveys measure the perceptions of Kosovo citizens on the main issues that preoccupy Kosovo society. Some important highlights are as follows:

- The satisfaction level with governing institutions of Kosovo has witnessed an overall decrease as compared to the September 2009 reporting period.
- The January 2010 poll results show that approximately 36% of survey respondents were satisfied with the work of the Government of Kosovo, a drop of some 20 percentage points since September 2009.
- Satisfaction with the work of KFOR and that of Kosovo Police (KPS) are the only two that saw positive changes since September 2009. Some 78% (as opposed to 72% in September 2009) of respondents are satisfied with the work of KFOR. Similarly, some 76% (as opposed to 71% in September 2009) respondents are satisfied with the work of the Kosovo Police.
- Satisfaction with the work of the Kosovo Assembly has decreased by some 13 percentage points since September 2009, now standing at 33%. In addition, satisfaction with the work of UNMIK has also decreased, reaching an all-time record low level of only 12% in January 2010
- The decreasing trend of satisfaction with the work of EULEX has continued even in the period of Oct-Dec 2009. As recorded by the January 2010 poll, about 30% of respondents are satisfied with the work of EULEX as opposed to 40% in September 2009.
- Compared to the September 2009 poll, the current poll shows an increase of 8 percentage points in the political pessimism of respondents, standing now at 41%. On the other hand, a 6-percentage-point decrease is observed in the respondents' willingness to protest for political reasons, standing now at 46%.
- The respondents' willingness to protest for economic reasons dropped by 3 percentage points, now standing at 63%, while there has

also been an increase of 4 percentage points in the respondents' economic pessimism indicator since September 2009, standing now at 61%.

- Similar to June and September 2009 polls, the January 2010 poll results show that, when asked about the circumstances that threaten Kosovo's stability, unemployment and poverty were cited by the majority of K-Albanian and Other minority respondents as the main factors. Further aggravation of interethnic relations, however, is the first major factor that threatens Kosovo's stability. for K-Serbs and is followed by unemployment and poverty.
- The January 2010 poll shows that the portion of K-Serbs willing to work with K-Albanians has significantly decreased to 29% since September 2009 after having experienced a substantial increase during the period of June to September 2009. As for K-Albanians, the indicator has not changed significantly, with some 46% of K-Albanians willing to work with K-Serbs.

While the report might be of interest to the general reader, its primary intention is to provide monitoring and conflict prevention

proposals for action by key actors within the Government of Kosovo and local leadership as well as development actors, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the International Civilian Office (ICO), EULEX, and the International Community in general. All conclusions and proposed recommendations presented in this report are a result of several rounds of discussions with professionals from diverse areas, backgrounds, and institutional settings.

We remain confident that the set of analyses presented in EWR #27 will stimulate a lot of thought and discussion among readers and that it will attract appropriate attention from the relevant political and other actors in Kosovo. It gives us great pleasure, therefore, to extend our appreciation and gratitude to the contributing experts that participated in discussions and provided their insights, perspectives, and interpreted the results of the opinion poll, and to all those who supported us in the process of completing this edition of EWR.

Tetsuo Kondo
UNDP Kosovo Deputy Director
March 2010

Executive Summary

- The satisfaction level with governing institutions of Kosovo has witnessed an overall decrease as compared to the September 2009 reporting period.
- The January 2010 poll results show that approximately 36% of survey respondents were satisfied with the work of the Government of Kosovo, a drop of some 20 percentage points since September 2009.
- Satisfaction with the work of KFOR and that of Kosovo Police (KPS) are the only two that saw positive changes since September 2009. Some 78% (as opposed to 72% in September 2009) of respondents are satisfied with the work of KFOR. Similarly, some 76% (as opposed to 71% in September 2009) respondents are satisfied with the work of the Kosovo Police.
- Satisfaction with the work of the Kosovo Assembly has decreased by some 13 percentage points since September 2009, now standing at 33%. In addition, satisfaction with the work of UNMIK has also decreased, reaching an all-time record low level of only 12% in January 2010
- The decreasing trend of satisfaction with the work of EULEX has continued even in the period of Oct-Dec 2009. As recorded by the January 2010 poll, about 30% of respondents are satisfied with the work of EULEX as opposed to 40% in September 2009.
- Compared to the September 2009 poll, the current poll shows an increase of 8 percentage points in the political pessimism of respondents, standing now at 41%. On the other hand, a 6-percentage-point decrease is observed in the respondents' willingness to protest for political reasons, standing now at 46%.
- The respondents' willingness to protest for economic reasons dropped by 3 percentage points, now standing at 63%, while there has also been an increase of 4 percentage points in the respondents' economic pessimism indicator since September 2009, standing now at 61%.
- Just like in June and September 2009, most respondents, regardless of ethnicity, think that the global economic crisis is affecting Kosovo.
- Similar to June and September 2009 polls, the January 2010 poll results show that, when asked about the circumstances that threaten Kosovo's stability, unemployment and poverty were cited by the majority of K-Albanian and Other minority respondents as the main factors. Further aggravation of interethnic relations, however, is the first major factor that threatens Kosovo's stability. for K-Serbs and is followed by unemployment and poverty.
- Similar to the October 2008, April, June, and September 2009 polls, the January 2010 results show that unemployment (47%) and poverty (25%) are the first two paramount problems that Kosovo faces. Corruption (7%) and electricity supply (5%) are the concerns following the first two.
- In general, the portion of those respondents feeling unsafe while outside on the street, according to the January 2010 poll is about 29%.
- The January 2010 poll shows that the portion of K-Serbs willing to work with K-Albanians has significantly decreased to 29% since September 2009 after having experienced a substantial increase during the period of June to September 2009. As for K-Albanians, the indicator has not changed significantly, with some 46% of K-Albanians willing to work with K-Serbs.

Methodology

The Kosovo Early Warning System Project is a component of UNDP's regional early warning framework. The project aims to build the capacity of local analysts to foresee potential crises, and to advise crisis prevention policies. Early Warning Reports are produced quarterly. The project is co-funded by USAID and UNDP. This Fact sheet is based on statistical analysis of an opinion poll conducted by UBO Consulting during the month of January 2010.

The survey was based on face-to-face interviews, and included 1,290 respondents: 830 K-Albanians, 230 K-Serbs, and 230 respondents from other minorities. The sample was selected through random sampling method and was stratified on the basis of geographic regions that are based on telephone area codes (7) and municipalities (30) and urban rural ratio (1:1). This Kosovo representative sample is calculated with a confidence level of 95% which yields a confidence interval (CI) of +/- 2.71.

Chapter 1

KOSOVO'S INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL STABILITY

I. Satisfaction with Kosovo's Institutions

The satisfaction level with governing institutions of Kosovo has seen a decrease in January 2010 as compared to the September 2009 reporting period, except for a slight increase in approval ratings for KFOR and Kosovo Police.

Compared to September 2009, the January 2010 poll results show that only about 36% of survey respondents are satisfied with the work of the Government of Kosovo, which indicates a significant decrease of some 20 percentage points.

Satisfaction with the work of KFOR and that of


Kosovo Police (KPS) are the only two that saw positive changes since September 2009. Some 78% (as opposed to 72% in September 2009) of respondents are satisfied with the work of KFOR. Similarly, some 76% (as opposed to 71% in September 2009) respondents are satisfied with the work of the Kosovo Police.

Satisfaction with the work of the Kosovo Assembly has decreased by some 13 percentage points since September 2009, now standing at 33%. In addition, satisfaction with the work of UNMIK has also decreased, reaching an all-time record low level of only 12% in January 2010

The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) approval ratings have again seen a decrease in January 2010, now standing at about 18% as compared to 26% in September 2009 (Figure 1.1).

The continuously increasing trend of satisfaction with the work of EULEX that was observed between May 2008 and June 2009 reversed according in September 2009. After dropping by 15 percentage points between June 2009 and September 2009, the EULEX approval ratings took another negative hit of some 10 percentage points between September 2009 and January 2010, currently standing at 30%.


Figure 1.1: Satisfaction with the work of institutions in Kosovo



Both the President and the Prime Minister have seen drops in their approval ratings between the September 2009 and January 2010 reporting periods, with the latter's being more significant. The approval ratings for the President currently stand at 58%, while the approval ratings for the Prime Minister currently stand at only 42%.

Kosovo courts continue to be the institutions that people are least satisfied with. The promising 12 percentage point increase in their satisfaction level between April and June 2009 did not continue. The current poll records a 10 percentage point decrease compared to September 2009, with only 15% of respondents, which marks an all-time low record, being satisfied with their work.

Figure 1.2: Satisfaction with the work of the Kosovo President, Prime Minister, and Courts



Kosovo's Political Direction


Compared to the September 2009 poll, the current poll shows an increase of 8 percentage points in the political pessimism of respondents, standing now at 41%. On the other hand, a 6-percentage-point decrease is observed in the respondents' willingness to protest for political reasons, standing now at 46%.

The degrees of political pessimism and willingness to protest for political reasons continue to vary across Kosovo (Figures 1.3). In the January 2010 poll, the Gjilan/Gnjilane region keeps the first place for the highest level

of political pessimism (about 50%), followed by the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region (over 48%), and Prishtinë/Priština (48%). According to the January 2010 poll, the Prizren region is the region with the lowest level of political pessimism (about 29%).

Gjilan/Gnjilane at 61% keeps first place for willingness to protest for political reasons. According to the January 2010 poll, however, runner-ups to Gjilan/Gnjilane as far as the willingness to protest for political reasons is concerned are Prishtinë/Priština (60%), and Peja/Peć (at about 49%). Prizren (24%) has the lowest level of willingness to protests for political reasons.

Figure 1.3: Level of political pessimism and political protests by region



Public Services

Education remains the public service with the most number of satisfied respondents since April 2009. According to the January 2010 poll results, Education (50%), followed by the Water Supply (43%), and Public Services (42%) represent public services with the highest number of satisfied people.

Since November 2007, Electricity continues to remain the lowest ranked public service or the public service that people are least satisfied with. The respondents' satisfaction with electricity (Kosovo Electrical Corporation, KEC) currently stands at only 21%.

Figure 1.4: Satisfaction with public services





Figure 1.5: Trend of respondents holding the Government of Kosovo or UNMIK responsible for Kosovo's political situation




II. Responsibility for Kosovo's Political Situation

Who is responsible?

The January 2010 poll results, just like other polls since July 2008, show that UNMIK is no longer perceived as the most responsible entity for the Kosovo's political situation. According to the January 2010 poll results, only 9% (no change since June 2009) of respondents hold UNMIK responsible for the political situation, while around 69% attribute this responsibility to the Government of Kosovo and political parties (an increase of some 7 percentage points since September 2009). About 23% of respondents, however, assign this responsibility to EULEX—a decrease of some 7 percentage points since September 2009 (Figure 1.5).

According to the January 2010 poll results, however, the fact remains that a greater number of Kosovans continue to hold the Government of Kosovo more responsible for Kosovo's political situation as opposed to UNMIK or EULEX, and this is the case across all of Kosovo's main regions, except for Gjilan/Gnjilane where EULEX seems to be thought of as more responsible than the Government of Kosovo in regards to the country's political situation (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6: Attribution of political responsibility by region




Protesting for political reasons

The January 2010 poll results show a small decrease of some 4 percentage points in the K-Albanian respondents' willingness to protest for political reasons as compared to the September 2009 poll results. The poll results also show a decrease of some 11 percentage points in the K-Serbs respondents' willingness to protest for political reasons, while at the same time they show an increase of some 8 percentage points in the willingness of Other minority respondents to protest for political reasons.

Currently, some 32% of K-Serbs, 48% of K-Albanians, and 38% of Other minority respondents would protest for political reasons (Figure 1.7). Since June 2009, K-Albanians have been the group with the highest willingness to protest for political reasons.

Figure 1.7: Willingness to protest for political reasons by ethnicity



III. Post-Status Kosovo

When people were asked about factors that are directly involved in threatening Kosovo's stability, unemployment and poverty were overwhelmingly quoted by the majority of K-Albanians (64%) and Others (68%) as the main factors threatening Kosovo's stability.

Further aggravation of interethnic relations (38%), however, remains the major factor that

threatens Kosovo’s stability, as opposed to unemployment and poverty, which K-Serbs selected in April 2009 (Table 1.1.).

Only about 1% of all Kosovans, according to the January 2010 poll results, consider religious radicalism to be a threatening problem to Kosovo’s stability.


Table 1.1: Opinion on circumstances that threaten the stability of Kosovo

	Ethnicity			Total Weighted
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Others	
Further aggravation of interethnic relations	2.9%	38.3%	4.3%	5.1%
Unemployment and poverty	63.9%	30.0%	68.2%	62.1%
Deterioration of relations with neighbouring countries	2.2%	.9%	1.7%	2.1%
Deterioration of relation with international community	3.5%	2.2%	3.0%	3.4%
Religious Radicalism	.4%	11.0%	.9%	1.0%
Political Radicalism	2.5%	3.5%		2.4%
Lack of rule of law	9.1%	7.5%	4.3%	8.7%
Corruption and mismanagement	13.2%	4.4%	6.9%	12.3%
DK/NA	2.4%	2.2%	10.7%	2.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Insofar as political preferences and willingness to vote of Kosovans are concerned, the January 2010 poll results show that about 16% (as opposed to 15% in September 2009) of Kosovans do not have any political preferences (i.e. no party allegiance) and another 16% (as opposed to 21% in September 2009) will not vote in the upcoming elections.

Surprisingly enough, on the other hand, some 53% (as opposed to 42% in September 2009) of Kosovans stated that they will vote in the upcoming elections and another 15% stated that they do not know yet what their decision will be about voting (Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.8: Political preferences and readiness to vote



IV. Conclusions of the Focus Group on Institutional and Political Stability Issues

According to the Focus Group convened to discuss the results of this EWS Opinion Poll, the following are worrying trends that require special attention:

- The percentage of respondents who would join protests due to the political situation still remains relatively high.
- Continued indication by all Kosovans regardless of ethnicity that unemployment and poverty are the most threatening factors to Kosovo’s stability.
- Decreasing trends in approval ratings for governing institutions of Kosovo.

The following factors have been identified by the Focus Group as elements contributing to institutional and political instability:

- Continued high expectations on positive

political developments – such as expectations in relation to recognition of Kosovo's independence by many more countries than those which have done so already.

- According to the Focus Group, one major problem in relation to political stability is that social, gender and youth issues continue to be disregarded in the political debate in Kosovo.
- The continued presence of Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo, hindering the inclusion and participation of K-Serbs into Kosovo's society.

Possible alarming scenarios identified by the Focus Group:

- The continued lack of political debate on gender, youth and overall social issues could, in the long run, create marginalized groups who will try to express their dissatisfaction outside of the system which in turn has the potential to lead to political destabilization and protests.
- Continued creation of alienation toward EU countries as a result of barriers to freedom of movement, such as complicated visa application processes, which is further


influenced by the exclusion of Kosovo from the "White Schengen" of visa requirements for citizens of Western Balkan countries.

In order to address the issues affecting institutional and political stability the following actions are recommended by the Focus Group:

- Political parties and the Government of Kosovo should continue to create mechanisms for female and youth participation in decision-making either by providing a certain number of seats in the leading boards of parties to youth and female members or by providing direct access for these groups to political party boards.
- The Government of Kosovo and especially the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice should take the issue of liberalization of visas more seriously by trying to meet the requirements for European Partnership which might indirectly lead to agreements for inclusion of Kosovo in the liberalization of visas within the EU, especially now that Kosovo is independent.
- Reforms in the Judiciary are a must for improving the performance of Kosovo's Courts.

In general, Kosovans seem to be more optimistic about the future than the current situation as far as employment opportunities are concerned. Regionally speaking, Gjakovë/Djakovica is the region with the highest current rate of pessimism about employment opportunities (75%), followed by Prishtinë/Prishtina (74%). Interestingly enough, these two regions also score highest on the rate of future pessimism about employment opportunities – Gjakovë/Djakovica and Prishtinë/Prishtina (at 53% and 61%, respectively).

Figure 2.1: Employment Pessimism and Optimism



According to the January 2010 poll results, the majority of Kosovans of all ethnicities (68%) have experienced neither a loss nor a gain in employment over the last six months. It should be noted however, that some 14% of K-Albanians, 11% of K-Serbs, and 8% of Other minorities experienced a job gain in the last six months, while some 5% of K-Albanians, 6% of K-Serbs, and 1% of Other minorities experienced a job loss in the last six months.

Compared to the July and November 2008 polls as well as the April, June, and September 2009 polls, the current poll results show no significant changes in the employment status of respondents.

Table 2.2: Changes in employment within family in the last six months

	Ethnicity grouped three			
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	Total Weighted
Get a Job	14.0%	10.6%	8.2%	13.5%
Lose a Job	5.0%	5.7%	1.3%	4.9%
Both	4.8%	7.0%	3.0%	4.8%
Neither	67.5%	65.2%	78.5%	68.0%
Don't know	5.0%	7.0%	4.3%	5.1%
Does not answer	3.6%	4.4%	4.7%	3.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As far as business activity is concerned in the last six months, the overwhelming majority of Kosovans of all ethnicities (80%) have neither started nor closed a business. Only about 4% of K-Albanians, 6% of K-Serbs, and 1% of Other minorities stated that they have started a new business in the period of last six months, while some 3% of K-Albanians, 3.5% of K-Serbs, and 2% of Other minorities closed a business within this reporting period.

Table 2.3: Business activity in the last six months

	Ethnicity grouped three			
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	Total Weighted
Start a business [shop, factory,	3.7%	6.2%	.9%	3.7%
Close a business	3.4%	3.5%	1.7%	3.3%
Both	1.4%	4.0%	1.7%	1.6%
Neither	79.6%	75.8%	82.8%	79.6%
Don't know	7.7%	7.5%	5.6%	7.5%
Does not answer	4.2%	3.1%	7.3%	4.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


II. Responsibility for the Economic Situation and Potential for Protests due to Economic Reasons

In terms of perceptions of responsibility for Kosovo's economic situation, the overwhelming majority of respondents (92% as opposed to 85% in September 2009) believe that the Government of Kosovo is most responsible. Attribution of responsibility to the Government of Kosovo has increased by some 7 percentage points since September 2009.

The January 2010 poll results show that the number of respondents holding UNMIK most responsible for Kosovo's economic situation has decreased to only 8% from 15% in September 2009.

The Government of Kosovo – even across regions – is still thought to be most responsible in terms of economic conditions of Kosovo (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Responsibility for the economic situation




As has been repeatedly indicated by previous Early Warning Reports, Kosovans' willingness to protest for economic reasons remains relatively high. However, the numbers have decreased slightly for K-Albanians; decreased significantly for Other minority respondents; and increased slightly for K-Serbs in comparison to the September 2009 poll.

According to the January 2010 poll results, about 63% of Kosovans are willing to protest for economic reasons, which is significantly higher

than their willingness to protest for political reasons (about 46%). About 47% (as opposed to 42% in September 2009) of K-Serbs and 49% (as opposed to 61% in September 2009) of Other minority respondents would also protest for economic reasons along with some 66% of K-Albanians (as opposed to 69% in September 2009) (Figure 2.3).


Figure 2.3: Willingness to protest for economic reasons



As shown at the beginning of this chapter, lack of economic prosperity continues to be one of the major problems facing Kosovo today. The January 2010 poll, just like the July and November 2008 polls as well as the April, June, and September 2009 polls, shows that this claim is further backed by the fact that most Kosovans (some 69%) who feel worried or anxious during the day do so because of economic reasons.

About 18% (as opposed to 11% in September 2009) of all Kosovans reported that they do not feel worried or anxious during the day, while about 38% reported to sometimes feel worried or anxious during the day, and some 40% (as opposed to 30% and 55%, respectively, in September 2009) feeling worried or anxious during the day almost always (Figure 2.4).


Figure 2.4: Feeling worried or anxious



The January 2010 poll results, just like the previous polls of May, July, and November 2008 as well as those of April, June, and September 2009, confirms that the main sources of worry and anxiety differ according to ethnicity. For K-Albanians and Other ethnicities the main reasons for their anxiety are economic, while for K-Serbs it is both safety and the economic situation (tied) (Figure 2.5).

For some 72% of K-Albanians and 72% of Other minority respondents the main reason for their anxiety is the economic situation, while some 31% of K-Serb respondents identified safety concerns tied with the economic situation as the main reasons for their anxiety.


Figure 2.5: Reasons for feeling worried or anxious



Moreover, Figure 2.6 shows that Kosovans in general believe that they can influence the direction of their life only to some extent. While the majority of respondents of each age group


feel this way, about a quarter of Kosovans (as opposed to 19% as in September 2009) across all age groups that believe they can influence the direction of their life a lot.

Figure 2.6: To what extent do you believe you can influence the direction of your life?



As to what is most important for a Kosovan to get a job in the public sector, things seem to have slightly changed according to the January 2010 poll results. According to all previous polls between May 2008, when this question was first included in the survey, and June 2009, respondents regardless of their gender in general believed that family connections were the most important factor to get a job in the public sector. Furthermore, the September 2009 poll results showed that, in general,

Figure 2.7: What is the most important factor to get employed in the public sector?




respondents believed bribes (24%) followed by family connections (21%) were the most important factors in getting employed in the public sector. But, according to the current poll, professional experience has emerged to be the most important factor to get a job in the public sector (26%), followed by bribes (25%).

III. Global Economic Crisis and Kosovo

Just like in April, June, and September 2009, most respondents (72%), regardless of ethnicity, think that the global economic crisis is affecting Kosovo.

Figure 2.8: Do you think that the global economic crisis is affecting Kosovo?



Furthermore, on average some 60% of all Kosovans feel the effects of the global economic crisis through higher prices. But, for half of K-Serbs, however, the effects of the crisis are more felt because of their job losses than higher prices.

Table 2.4: Improved Economy and Kosovo's Safety and Security

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	Total Weighted
Loss of job	9.2%	50.0%	5.7%	11.44%
Higher prices	63.3%	32.8%	68.1%	61.78%
Less support from family/ relatives abroad	11.5%	.9%	9.9%	10.74%
Decrease in business profit	8.7%	14.7%	2.8%	8.73%
DK/NA	7.3%	1.7%	13.5%	7.31%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.00%

IV. Conclusions of the Focus Group on Economic and Social Stability Issues

According to the Focus Group convened to discuss the results of this EWS Opinion Poll, the following are worrying trends that require special attention:

- The number of respondents declaring their readiness to join public protests about the current economic situation in Kosovo continues to remain worrisome.
- The high level of respondents stating that unemployment and poverty represent the most important issues faced by Kosovo.
- The high percentage of respondents who feel worried or anxious during the day due to economic reasons especially among K-Albanians and Other minorities.
- Very little consideration for education as an important factor to gain employment in the public sector and the high consideration given for bribes and family connections as important factors to gain employment in the public sector.
- The negative effects of the Global Economic Crisis in Kosovo are felt.

The following factors have been identified by Focus Group discussions as elements contributing to Economic and Social instability:

- Extent of the informal economy which forces some to hide income and under-report for lower payment of taxes.
- Lack of a major and vivid influx of investment in quality of life standards in Kosovo – something that was long promised to people after independence.

- Continued problems with electricity and other public services.
- Increased nepotism in public institutions and services.
- Lack of consideration regarding the value of quality education for employment in the public sector.
- Lack of transparency of public sector hiring process.

Possible alarming scenarios identified by Focus Groups:

- Decrease of trust toward institutions and widespread perception of corruption can result in a tendency for people not to fulfill their obligations as citizens with regard to payment of public services as well as taxes.
- Dissatisfaction and concerns about employment and poverty are more pronounced.
- The government may become unable to deliver on its promises if it continues to disregard quality education and professional experience of candidates for employment in the public sector. Bribing

as a key factor to gain employment in the public sector presents a major challenge for the government.

- Continuation of the Global Economic Crisis can further aggravate the economic situation in Kosovo.

In order to address Economic and Social issues the following actions are recommended by the Focus Group:

- Fiscal reforms especially as far as simplification and decrease of various taxes at both municipal and central level are concerned.
- The government should review its hiring procedures for public institutions and should pay particular attention to avoiding nepotism. The government should also prioritize education and professional experience as key factors for the recruitment policy in public sector agencies.
- The government should have a concrete plan to support Kosovo's economy in case it gets substantially hit by the Global Economic Crisis.

Chapter 3


INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

I. Main Trends

As with previous polls since May 2008, the January 2010 poll results show that the majority of K-Albanian respondents and Other minority respondents continue to believe that interethnic relations are improving (62% and 56%, respectively), while some 12% of K-Serbs believe the same (Figure 3.1).

It is worrisome that the portion of K-Serbs who believe that interethnic relations are improving dropped by some 18 percentage points since September 2009.


Figure 3.1: Interethnic relations between K-Serbs and K-Albanians



As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the January 2010 poll results show a significantly steep increase of some 27 percentage points of K-Serb respondents believing that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving, as compared to September 2009.

As for K-Albanians, the current poll, just like the September 2009 poll, shows a decrease of only 7 percentage points in their belief that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving.


Figure 3.2: Trend of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving



The January 2010 poll results, just like previous polls, confirm that the reasons given for the lack of improvement of tense interethnic relations, especially between the K-Albanians and K-Serbs, remain different depending on ethnicity (Figure 3.3).

Over half of K-Albanians believe that the main factor for tense K-Serb – K-Albanian relations is the influence of Belgrade (53%), followed by lack of readiness of K-Serbs to be integrated in Kosovo society (19%). Other minorities have a similar opinion with K-Albanians, so some 47% of them think that influence of Belgrade, followed by some 10% citing the attitudes of K-Serb leaders as key factors for tense K-Serb – K-Albanian relations.

On the other hand, K-Serbs believe that the major factors for tense relations with K-Albanians are the insufficient efforts on the part of K-Albanians to better foster interethnic integration (57%), followed by the attitudes of K-Albanian leaders (18%).



II. Interethnic Contacts and Coexistence

Another important indicator of interethnic relations is the willingness of K-Serbs to work and live together with K-Albanians. As can be seen from Figure 3.4, there has been an important increase, since the September 2009 reporting period, in the readiness of K-Serbs to live in the same town and on the same street with K-Albanians. About 31% (as opposed to 27% in September 2009) of K-Serbs would agree to live in the same town with K-Albanians, followed by 21% (as opposed to 15% in September 2009) who would agree to live on the same street with K-Albanians.

The willingness of K-Serbs to work with K-Albanians, however, has decreased since September 2009. Currently, some 29% of K-Serbs would agree to work with K-Albanians (as opposed to 38% in September 2009).

As far as interethnic marriages are concerned, no K-Serbs show willingness to marry K-Albanians.




Figure 3.5: K-Albanians that would agree to live and work with K-Serbs



On the other hand, the attitude of K-Albanians towards either living in the same town or on the same street or working with K-Serbs has seen no significant changes since September 2009.


However, according to the January 2010 poll results, some 45% of K-Albanians would agree to work with K-Serbs, while some 42% of them would agree to live in the same town with K-Serbs, and some 35% would agree to live on the same street with K-Serbs. Only about 2% of K-Albanians though would marry K-Serbs (Figure 3.5).

As to the prospects of having interethnic relations normalize, the January 2010 poll results once again show that K-Serbs continue to be the most pessimistic among all ethnicities in Kosovo.

About 43% of K-Serbs (as opposed to 22% in September 2009) believe that interethnic relations between K-Serbs and K-Albanians will never normalize. Of the same opinion are some 19% of K-Albanians (as opposed to 22% in September 2009) and some 16% of Other minorities (as opposed to 25% in September 2009).

The most optimistic – those who believe that relations will normalize in the near future – are K-Albanians (33%) followed by Others (31%), and K-Serbs with 3% (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6: Prognosis on when interethnic relations will normalize



Just like the previous polls since May 2008, the September 2009 poll shows that almost no K-Serbs believe that interethnic relations are already normal while 4% of K-Albanians and 3% of Other minorities believe this to be true about interethnic relations.

III. Conclusions of the Focus Group on Interethnic Issues

According to the Focus Group convened to discuss the results of this EWS Opinion Poll, the following are worrying trends that require special attention:

- The high number of K-Serbs believing that relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs are tense and will continue to be so in the future.
- Continued difference of opinions of K-Serbs and K-Albanians on who should work more to improve interethnic relations.
- The relatively high K-Serb pessimism on the normalization of interethnic relations.

The following factors have been identified by Focus Group discussions as elements contributing to the current interethnic situation:

- Further polarization and radicalization of both K-Albanians and K-Serbs could take place, if the post-status reality of Kosovo is not accepted by all Kosovans equally.
- The influence of Belgrade is hindering the integration of K-Serbs into the Kosovo institutions and society, especially the requests and calls from Belgrade to the K-Serbs to create their own parallel structures.

- Continued boycott of Kosovo's institutions by the majority of K-Serbs.

Possible alarming scenarios identified by Focus Group:

- Further prolongation of the final status recognition by Serbia and Russia has negative consequences for interethnic relations.
- Lack of K-Serbs willingness to be part of Kosovo's democratically elected governing institutions.

In order to address the current interethnic situation the following actions are recommended by the Focus Group:

- The international community should not allow any dysfunction of the international presence in Kosovo. This could alienate the majority of Kosovans, which in return could negatively affect their relations with other minorities.
- During this first phase of post-status Kosovo, the Government of Kosovo in cooperation with the international community should work harder to make sure that the new state is subject to full implementation of the rule of law on an equal basis for all its citizens.
- The international community should immediately start helping the Government of Kosovo in the field of economic development, which would undoubtedly result in an improvement of interethnic relations in Kosovo.

Chapter 4


PUBLIC AND PERSONAL SECURITY

I. Satisfaction with Security Institutions

Just as in all previous polls, K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. The January 2010 poll results show that satisfaction with security institutions such as KFOR, Kosovo Security Force (former Kosovo Protection Corps, KPC), and the Kosovo Police (former KPS) has slightly improved since September 2009 (Figure 4.1).

Except for the EULEX Police, the rest of Kosovo’s security institutions enjoy approval ratings of 80% or higher.


Figure 4.1: K-Albanians satisfaction with security institutions



Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with security institutions in Kosovo have not recuperated significantly since their major drops in

November 2008 and April 2009. The only positive change that happened between June and September 2009—K-Serbs’ significant increase in satisfaction with KFOR—took a negative hit between September 2009 and January 2010 (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: K-Serbs satisfaction with security institutions



While other security institutions saw no significant changes in terms of K-Serbs satisfaction with their work, KFOR’s rating dropped by some 14 percentage points, currently standing at 4% as opposed to 18% in September 2009.

Table 4.1: Assessment of community-police relations

	Ethnicity			Total Weighted
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	
Very good	20.9%	.4%	9.0%	18.9%
Good	46.2%	6.6%	55.4%	44.3%
Neither good nor bad	19.1%	37.0%	22.7%	20.4%
Bad	4.7%	29.5%	2.1%	6.0%
Very bad	1.2%	15.9%	.9%	2.1%
DK	6.1%	6.2%	7.3%	6.2%
NA	1.9%	4.4%	2.6%	2.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Similar to previous polls since May 2008, the current poll also shows that the majority of K-Albanians and Other minorities (except for K-Serbs) consider community-police relations to be good or very good (Table 4.1).

Compared to the September 2009 poll results, the January 2010 poll results show an increase of some 5 percentage points in the portion of K-Serbs considering the community-police relations to be good or very good, currently standing at only 7%, as opposed to 2% in September 2009, while 45% of them consider these relations to be bad or very bad (as opposed to 33% in September 2009).

When asked why they considered community-police relations to be bad or very bad, some 28% of K-Albanians said that people feel the police are weak and incompetent, while some 25.5% said that people do not trust the police. The third major reason given by K-Albanians (18%) for bad or very bad community-police relations is that the people do not want to cooperate with the police (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Reasons for bad community-police relations

	Ethnicity grouped three			
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	Total Weighted
People don't trust the police	25.5%	54.0%	26.7%	27.3%
People don't want to cooperate with the police	17.8%	4.3%	20.0%	17.1%
People feel the Police is weak and incompetent	27.9%	15.0%	26.7%	27.0%
The Police doesn't try to improve relations with the community	8.2%	2.7%	6.7%	7.8%
People feel the Police is corrupt and easy to bribe	8.7%	18.7%	5.0%	9.0%
Something else	1.0%			.8%
DK	2.9%	2.1%	10.0%	3.3%
NA	8.2%	3.2%	5.0%	7.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

On the other hand, the three major reasons that K-Serbs give for this kind of relation are: people do not trust the police (54%), people feel that the police is corrupt and easy to bribe (19%), and police are weak and incompetent (15%).

For Other minorities the first three major reasons given include: (1) police are weak and incompetent, tied with (2) people do not trust the police (27%), followed by (3) the people do not want to cooperate with the police (20%) (Table 4.2).

Generally, the main reasons given for bad community-police relations is that the police do not try to improve relations with the community (16%), followed by people not wanting to cooperate with the police (14%) and people not trusting police (13%).

II. Personal and Family Security

Respondents were asked to list what they see as the biggest threats to their family security and safety (Table 4.3). When analyzed based on ethnicity, the three top security threats for K-Albanian respondents, according to the January 2010 poll, include: (1) thefts (23%), (2) organized crime/mafia (17%), and (3) poverty (15%).

Table 4.3: Threats to family security, by ethnicity

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Others	Total
Rooberies	4.8%	7.5%	5.0%	5.0%
Thefts	23.1%	22.5%	25.0%	23.2%
Kidnappings	1.4%	7.5%		1.7%
Murders	7.7%	6.4%	8.3%	7.7%
Traffic Accidents	6.7%	2.1%	1.7%	6.2%
Organized Crime/Mafia	16.8%	38.0%	33.3%	19.1%
Home Accidents	1.0%	.5%		.9%
Fires	.5%			.4%
Poverty	14.9%	9.6%	16.7%	14.7%
Infectious Diseases	1.4%			1.3%
Drugs	4.3%			3.8%
Other	.5%			.4%
DK/NA	16.8%	5.9%	10.0%	15.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

K-Serbs identify the same threats as K-Albanians, including (1) organized crime/mafia (38%), (2) thefts (22.5%), and (3) poverty (10%). As for the Other minority respondents, top three threats include: (1) organized crime/mafia (33%), (2) thefts (25%), and (3) poverty (17%). Overall, the major threats to family security identified by Kosovans include: (1) thefts (23%), (2) organized crime/mafia (19%), and (3) poverty (15%). On top of it being perceived as a paramount problem that Kosovo faces and as a factor that threatens stability, poverty seems to be at the heart of threatening issues to Kosovo's overall stability and development.

The January 2010 poll results show an increase of some 7 percentage points in the level of perception among K-Serbs regarding safety while outside on the street. This indicator now shows that about 10% of K-Serbs feel safe (very safe or somewhat safe) when outside.


As for K-Albanians, some 66% (as opposed to 78% in September 2009) feel very safe or somewhat safe, along with Other minorities out of whom some 62% (as opposed to 78% in September 2009) feel very safe or somewhat safe (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4: Safety vs. crime and violence when outside

	Ethnicity			Total Weighted
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	
Very safe	24.3%	.9%	12.0%	22.2%
Somewhat safe	41.6%	9.7%	40.8%	39.6%
Somewhat unsafe	16.7%	32.2%	25.3%	18.1%
Very unsafe	7.6%	42.3%	5.6%	9.5%
NA	9.8%	15.0%	16.3%	10.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Among K-Albanians, it is hard to identify a trend of feeling of safety and its relation to age. The K-Albanian 18-24 years age group has the lowest percentage (58%) of feeling safe out in the street, whereas the group that feels safest is the 31-36 age group (72%). that feels safest is the 31-36 age group (81%).


Figure 4.3: Feeling safe out on the street for K-Albanians



Just like with K-Albanians, in the case of K-Serbs it is also impossible to identify a trend of safety feeling according to age group (Figure 4.4).

The K-Serbs' age group with the lowest percentage of those feeling safe (4%) is the age group of 46+ years. Whereas, the age group of people having 37-45 years has the highest percentage (13%) of those feeling safe.

Figure 4.4: Feeling safe out on the street for K-Serbs



III. Human Rights and Discrimination

According to the current poll, when asked about whether they were in a situation in which they felt discriminated against in the last six month, the overwhelming majority of respondents, regardless of ethnicity, responded negatively.

Only about 12% of K-Albanians, 15% of K-Serbs, and 7% of Other minority respondents said that they faced a situation in which they felt discriminated against.

Table 4.5: Discrimination in the last six months

	Ethnicity			Total
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	
Yes	12.2%	15.0%	6.9%	12.07%
No	83.9%	76.2%	83.7%	83.46%
Refuse	3.8%	8.8%	9.4%	4.47%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.00%

As to what institution or entity respondents considered the most responsible for discrimination against them, overall the top three institutions selected by respondents (regardless of ethnicity) were the Central Government, Municipalities, and Public Health Institutions.

For K-Albanians, these top three institutions are the Central Government and Municipalities tied with Public Healthcare, while for K-Serbs they are the Central Government, Municipalities and Courts. Municipalities and Kosovo Police, followed by a tie between Central Government, Public Healthcare and Public Education are the top institutions responsible for discrimination against the Other minority respondents (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Institutions most responsible for discrimination

	Ethnicity grouped three			Total Weighted
	K-Albanians	K-Serbs	Others	
Municipalities	15.0%	24.2%	16.0%	15.61%
Kosovo Police	11.0%	9.1%	16.0%	11.19%
Courts	5.0%	12.1%	8.0%	5.61%
KPA or KAP	2.0%	9.1%		2.31%
A public company (KEK, PTK, Water companies etc)	4.0%	6.1%	8.0%	4.36%
A private Company	9.0%		8.0%	8.40%
A public health institution	15.0%		12.0%	13.92%
A private health institution	2.0%			1.76%
A public school or academic institution	7.0%		12.0%	6.88%
Central Government (ministries others services provided)	29.0%	33.3%	12.0%	28.24%
One of the international presences in Kosovo		6.1%	4.0%	0.60%
Other	1.0%		4.0%	1.12%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.00%

IV. Conclusions of the Focus Group on Public and Personal Security Issues

According to the Focus Group convened to discuss the results of this EWS Opinion Poll, the following are worrying trends that require special attention:

- The large number of K-Serb respondents that report feeling unsafe when outside.
- A relatively low proportion of K-Serbs being satisfied with Kosovo security institutions.

The following issues have been identified as potential problems contributing to public and personal security issues:

- The lack of regular reporting (e.g., monthly reports on security issues and statistics) of KPS and KFOR in the media.
- The dire economic situation in households and the lack of improvement in this regard which is a precondition for crime and violence.
- Prevalence of poverty, thefts, and organized crime as a key threats to family security.
- The low level of trust in the Kosovo Police by K-Serbs.

Possible scenarios identified by the Focus Group:

- Interethnic relations may deteriorate further because of a lack of trust on the side of K-Serbs in security institutions.
- Security for all may further deteriorate because of the lack economic prosperity which may bring about more aggressive behavior in certain groups of people.

The Focus Group recommends the following actions as necessary to address the public and personal security issues:

- Kosovo security institutions should work more closely with minority communities through creative programs that would help raise the level of trust in these institutions.
- The Government of Kosovo in cooperation with the international presence in Kosovo should intervene to make sure that no parallel structures of governance or security operate in Kosovo.

Chapter 5

DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS AND NEWLY ESTABLISHED MUNICIPALITIES IN KOSOVO


By Atdhe Hetemi,
EWS Project Officer

This section of the report presents a brief analysis of the Kosovans knowledge, satisfaction, as well as readiness to support the decentralization process and newly established municipalities in Kosovo. The decentralization process started in 2002¹ and became mandatory for the Kosovo Government with the Comprehensive Status Proposal, the Ahtisaari Plan², which was adapted by the Assembly of Kosovo. Decentralization is the process of either delegating or transferring certain powers from the central level to the municipalities in order to develop a system of local self-government. One of the main reasons why governments decentralize is to offer new privileges to local government as it allows many decisions to be taken by local communities rather than by the central authorities. Furthermore, governments decentralize in order to promote good governance, economic development, efficiency in the delivery of public services, and to accommodate the interests of diverse communities.

Kosovans perceptions, attitude and knowledge about the Decentralization Process

A series of themes were explored with respondents in an attempt to measure Kosovo citizen's knowledge, perceptions and attitudes toward, Decentralization. These surveys included citizen's attitudes toward the definition of the decentralisation, divided by ethnicity and region, as well as ethnic comparisons of the impact of decentralization is provided.

Figure 1: What is your understanding of 'decentralization'?³




When the understanding of decentralization was analyzed, results revealed that 29% of respondents think that decentralization is a process that develops new privileges for local authorities, whereas 24% of respondents have no answer or do not know what decentralization is (fig 1).

1 For more info please check Council of Europe Decentralization Mission in Kosovo (CoEDM) Final Report http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1329_1201699079_1006-1174404171-sg-inf-2003-39.pdf
2 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html>

3 These data's have been conducted by UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governance and Administration „Citizens Attitude Toward Decentralization Process in Kosovo“


Figure 2: Responses to what is your understanding of 'decentralization'? (by ethnicity)



When the same question was analyzed by ethnicity (fig 2), results revealed that 53 % of K-Serbs understand that decentralization means new privileges for local government, and only 24.70% of K-Albanians have the same understanding of this process. Another interesting result is that 19.80% of K-Serbs do not know what decentralization means, compared to 34% of other non-Serb minorities that do not know what decentralization is.

When breaking down survey respondents' characterization of the process of decentralisation according to their place of residence, notable differences are observed. For example, a significant portion of respondents from Gjakovë/Djakovica reported that they consider decentralisation to be a process that enables use of equal instruments by all municipalities. An additional important difference is the discrepancy in the portion of respondents who cannot provide a definition of decentralisation. For instance, some 43 % of respondents from Ferizaj/Uroševac and 34 percent of respondents from Prizren/Prizren were not able to provide a description of the process of decentralisation. This is significantly higher when compared to respondents from Prishtinë/Priština, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and Pejë/Peć, where only 20 percent, 19 percent and 10 percent of respondents, respectively, failed to provide a definition of decentralisation (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Definition of 'decentralization' by regions



When the educational background of the respondents was analysed, it came out that 39 percent of the respondents that had no answer or did not know what decentralization is possess only Primary Education. As expected, 43 percent of the respondents that think decentralisation means new privileges for local government holds a University Degree or possesses higher education.

Figure 4 Definition of 'decentralization' according to the educational background of the respondents






Figure 5 Definition of 'decentralization' (by gender)




On the other hand, when the definition of decentralisation is analysed on a gender basis, no significant differences could be observed (Fig 5), except for the fact that the number of females that do not know about decentralisation is higher compared to the number of males that have no answer in this regard. Differences between ethnic groups in Kosovo, especially K-Albanians and K-Serbs, become apparent when respondents are asked how each ethnic group will be affected by the decentralisation process.

Figure 6: How will the decentralization process impact K-Albanians?⁴



Approximately 35% of K-Albanian respondents said that their ethnic group will benefit from the decentralisation process, which is in strong contrast to 55% of K-Serbs that declared that K-Albanians will benefit from the process. Non-Serbian minorities were slightly less likely than K-Serbs to state that K-Albanians will benefit from the process, although 43% did so. It is important to note that the highest portion of K-Albanian respondents indicated that they believe the decentralisation process will neither help nor hurt their ethnic group, with almost 40% reflecting this attitude. On the other hand, 15% of K-Albanians said the process will hurt their ethnic community (Figure 6).

Figure 7: How will the decentralization process affect K-Serbs?⁵



When the same question is asked regarding the influence of the decentralisation process on K-Serbs, the distributions change significantly. For example, almost 80% of K-Albanians stated that K-Serbs will ultimately benefit from this process, with a similar portion of other minorities sharing this opinion (72%). Only 23% of K-Serb respondents believe that their community will benefit from the process, with another 35% stating that they believe their community will actually lose as a result of the process (Figure 7).


4 The data have been conducted by UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governance and Administration, "Citizens Attitude Toward Decentralization Process in Kosovo" (is this a report? Need reference)

Support for the Newly Established Municipalities

As a result of local government reform and the decentralization of authority from central to local government, new municipalities are supposed to be established in Kosovo. The decision for the establishment of new pilot Municipalities was signed on 13 September 2005 by SRSJ Mr. Soeren Jessen-Petersen. The first pilot Municipalities created were Mamushë/Mamusha, Hani i Elezit/Djeneral and Junik/Jankovic.


When respondents were asked about their attitudes toward the creation of new Municipalities as a product of decentralisation, the survey results showed that 42% of the respondents support the creation of new Municipalities. (fig 8).

Fig 8: Support the creation of new municipalities as a product of decentralization⁵



When the same question was analyzed on an ethnic basis, results show that 46% of K-Albanians support the creation of new municipalities, whereas only 25% of K-Serbs do the same, meanwhile 34% of K-Serbs oppose the creation of the new municipalities which are supposed to be established as a product of decentralisation. (fig 9).

Fig 9: Support the creation of new municipalities as a product of decentralization (by ethnicities)




When the regionally based survey was held, the respondents' attitude toward the creation of new municipalities varies widely across different regions of Kosovo. For instance, a significant majority of respondents from Vushtrri/Vucitrn, Obilic, Istog/Istok and Drenas/Glllogovc/Glogovac support the establishment of new municipalities as required by the decentralisation process. On the other hand, a significant portion of respondents from Gjilan/Gnjilane, Prizren, Zveçan/Zvecan and Zubin Potok are against this process. The majority of respondents from Shtime/Štimlje, Leposaviq/Leposavić, Gjakova/Djakova and Deçan/Deçane were neither supportive, nor opposed to the creation of these new municipalities (fig 10).

5 IBID

6 These data's have been conducted by UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governance and Administration „Citizens Attitude Toward Decentralization Process in Kosovo“

Figure 10: Support for the creation of new municipalities according to Municipalities



Satisfaction with Newly Established Municipalities

As mentioned above some Pilot Municipalities were established during 2005, beside this fact main obstructions that made the decentralisation process harder for the period of 2005-2009 are considered to be as follows:

- It is well known that the democratic elections are supposed to play a crucial role in the establishment of new municipalities. According to the law, Kosovo's President is obliged to announce the election date at least 4 months in advance⁷, but according to the experts that followed closely this process during the last elections (November

2009), most of the decisions were made last minute. The lack of a common agenda of the international community in Kosovo created a pre-election confusion which delayed many decisions of the Kosovo authorities and the International Civilian Office (ICO)⁸, which almost brought the process of decentralisation at the brink of failure⁹.

- Parallel administrative structures sponsored by Belgrade were strengthened and are operating in most of the predominantly K-Serb municipalities, including in the fields of justice, education, health care, and the postal service¹⁰. The existence of these structures represents a hindering factor for the functionality of the new municipalities.

However, besides these barriers, Kosovo's legislative framework for the establishment of new municipalities has developed substantially, and the Assembly of Kosovo has amended applicable legislation and adopted a number of new laws. These were drafted with significant International Civilian Office (ICO) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)¹¹ support, including the Law on Local Self-Government, the Law on Administrative Municipal Boundaries, the Law on Local Elections, and the Law on Local Government Finance. This new legal framework provides for a large degree of local governance and for clearer municipal competences. It also envisages increasing the number of municipalities from 30 to 38. In April 2008, an inter-ministerial working group was established and an action plan for the implementation of decentralization in 2008-2010 was approved¹².

The process has been very positive and, as a result of that, all Municipal Preparation Teams (MPT) have been established. They

7 Law on Local Elections, Article 4.3


8 For more infos about ICO please visit <http://www.ico-kos.org/?id=2>
 9 Face to face interview with Krenar Gashi, Research Director of Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED)
 10 Nations in Transit 2009-Kosovo <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kosovo-final.pdf>
 11 For more infos about USAID Kosovo please visit <http://www.usaid.gov/kosovo/eng/overview.html>
 12 Nations in Transit 2009-Kosovo <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kosovo-final.pdf>

successfully completed the election process held on 15 November 2009, the participation of Serbs was satisfactory and, as a final result, we have democratically elected bodies in the municipality of Graçanicë/Gracanica, Kllokot/Klokot and Ranillug/Ranilug¹³

Thus, after the November 2009 elections in Kosovo, legal newly established municipalities, including the ones established before, are: Graçanicë/Graçanica, Ranillug/Ranilug, Klokot/Vrbovac, expanded Artanë/Novo Berdo, Shterpce/Sterpce, Mamushe/Mamusha, Hani i Elezit/Djeneral, Junik/Jankovic. Democratic participation has empowered these municipalities as well as given them control over the affairs closest to people's lives will, which will empower their citizens further. Municipalities have a right to work together for the protection and promotion of their common interests, as well as to form partnerships within their areas of competence. These partnerships can also provide training, research, technical assistance and policy recommendations.


The fact that these municipalities, and MPTs, have been created indicates that productive work has been done so far. When the satisfaction with the process of newly established municipalities Graçanicë/ Gracanica, Kllokot/Klokot and Ranillug/Ranilug was analyzed, results clarified that a majority, or 44%, of the respondents are dissatisfied with the process (fig 12).

Fig. 11: How satisfied are you with the process of newly established municipalities?¹⁴



When the same question was analyzed on an ethnic basis, it came out that almost 70% of K-Serbs remain unsatisfied with this process and only 2.6% of K-Serbs are satisfied with it, whereas only 37% of K-Albanians and 46% of other communities (except K-Serbs) are satisfied with the process of newly established municipalities (fig 13).

Fig. 12 How satisfied are you with the process of newly established Municipalities? (by ethnicities)



Quite worrying results were seen when the educational background of the respondents was analyzed (fig 14). Results show that only 13 % of the respondents that possess a University or higher degree are satisfied with process of Newly Established Municipalities, comparing to almost 50% of dissatisfied respondents with the same educational background. 43% of other satisfied respondents were uneducated.

When attempted to measure whether the satisfaction is impacted by knowledge, results prove that even though only 29% (fig 1) of respondents are familiar with the understanding of decentralisation, a larger number of respondents are satisfied with the implementation of this process (around 32%, fig 8).


At the beginning of 2010, the Kosovo Government and the ICO appointed a Municipal Preparation Team (MPT) for the new municipality of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North. The MPT has a technical mandate to prepare all resources, properties and administrative structures required for the future establishment and functioning of the new municipality of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North. The appointed members of the MPT will be

13 WORK REPORT ON WORKING GROUPS ON DECENTRALISATION (April 2009- February 2010)

14 These data's have been conducted by UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governance and Administration „Citizens Attitude Toward Decentralization Process in Kosovo“

joined by one representative of the Ministry of Local Government Administration, one representative of the “mother municipality” and one representative of the International Civilian Office¹⁵.

Fig. 13 How satisfied are you with the process of newly established Municipalities? (education)



Instead of Conclusion

The Focus Group considered that, so far, the decentralisation process in Kosovo went relatively well. The fact that during the November 2009 elections, K-Serbs from Artanë/ Novo Berdo voted and elected as their mayor an Albanian candidate is evaluated as highly positive¹⁶. The visibility and people’s readiness to apply for employment, as well as contribute to the sustainability of these municipalities is seen as a positive development, even though the Kosovo Government must acknowledge the fact that it can take years for these municipalities to become fully functional.

So far, conclusions, as well as recommendations, identified by the Focus Group regarding the decentralization process and the Newly Established Municipalities are as follows:

- The government and international partners that are engaged in the process should acknowledge the fact that with

the establishment of new municipalities and local government reform, Kosovo municipalities will face insufficient economic, administrative and manpower capacity to effectively carry out the increased number of tasks placed upon them. The applied model of the decentralization framework does not sufficiently distinguish among large and small or urban and rural municipalities which may create additional constraints for smooth implementation of the reform.

- One of the biggest challenges for the creation of new municipalities, but also for the existing ones, is political. The establishment of a new municipality in North Mitrovica, the implementation of the so-called Strategy for northern Kosovo, the existence of parallel political and administrative structures, but also those of interior and intelligence, will cause an unavoidable clash with policies and governance of the newly elected municipal authorities, creating political and social turmoil.
- The Ministry of Local Administration and the ICO should make better advertisement of the decentralisation process since, according to the measurement through questionnaires, some communities have no proper understanding of this process.

¹⁵ ICO News Release no. 01/2010 <http://www.ico-kos.org/d/100205%20MN%20MPT%20appointments%20English.pdf>

¹⁶ Face to face interview with Krenar Gashi, Research Director of Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED)

SELECTED MEDIA EVENTS

October – December 2009

"1-Oct-09

"UN assumes responsibility for February 2007 deaths (Koha Ditore)

Citing unnamed sources in UNMIK, Koha Ditore reports that the United Nations has assumed a part of the responsibility for the events of 10 February 2007 in which two people were killed and several others were injured during an intervention by UNMIK Police in response to a protest by the Vetëvendosja Movement."

Ambassador Giffon – EU special emissary for north Kosovo (Koha Ditore)

"Jones: Kosovo has become a factor of stability in the region (dailies)

Dailies report that the U.S. Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of State Stewart Jones said during a session on challenges at the American Helsinki Committee that the western Balkans region has moved forward."

2-Oct-09

"123 students in Fushë Kosovë poisoned, cause unknown (dailies)

All dailies report on their front pages that 123 students from a high school and an elementary school in Fushë Kosovë, near Pristina, were poisoned yesterday and were given medical assistance at Pristina Hospital."

"Victims" families reject compensation offer (dailies)

Families of the victims killed during the Vetëvendosja protest of February 2007 requested the UN Mission in Kosovo to accept in a written statement institutional and individual responsibility for the killing of Arben Xheladini and Mon Balaj, and to remove immunity from the persons responsible for the crime, namely the Romanian police officers who fired rubber bullets at the protesters, and former UNMIK Police Commissioner Stephen Curtis."

Bogdanovic: UNHCR to assist to return Serbs to Kosovo (dailies)

7-Oct-09

Berisha: Albanians – one nation but two states in EU (dailies)

11-Oct-09

"Thaçi: Serbs participating in elections like never before (Koha Ditore)

Koha Ditore reports that Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi stated on Saturday in Skënderaj that the Serb community is taking part in the election process as never before. "The Kosovo Government will fulfill all of its obligations in relation to organizing elections of a higher standard."

"Against territorial exchange (Express)

Express reports that the Italian Ambassador to Kosovo considers that debates around territorial exchanges in Balkans are a major mistake. He considers that the Balkans region will stabilize only by keeping present borders and integrating the region into the European Union."

14-Oct-09

"Agreement on border demarcation reached with Macedonia (dailies)

Dailies report that Kosovo institutions have accepted the latest proposal on the border line with Macedonia, made by technical commissions and international partners."

"Security Council to discuss Ban Ki-moon's report on Kosovo tomorrow (Zëri)

Zëri reports that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will present his report on UNMIK's work in Kosovo to the UN Security Council tomorrow."

"Assembly appoints RTK Board (dailies)

Dailies report that the Kosovo Assembly has now appointed nine RTK Board members."

"Two bomb alarms in Pristina, one true, the other false (dailies)

All dailies report that two bomb alarms, one of them real and the other one false, yesterday disturbed the citizens of Pristina. KFOR soldiers conducted the controlled detonation of a hand grenade which was placed in the front yard of the Rectorate of Pristina University. The second alarm about an explosive device, which proved to be false, took place at the District Court in Pristina. Dailies also note that police still has no suspects."

15-Oct-09

"European Commission presents report on Kosovo (dailies)

Papers report that European Commission yesterday in Brussels presented reports on the countries involved in the EU enlargement process."

Mirel presents report to Kosovo authorities (dailies)

"Kosovo without cooperation protocols with Podgorica and Skopje (dailies)

Koha Ditore reports that the Republic of Kosovo has not yet signed an agreement for police cooperation with Macedonia as it did with Albania. A similar agreement was signed with Serbia by EULEX on Kosovo's behalf. Koha Ditore considers that such police agreements help to combat organized crime, terrorism and other cross-border criminal activities."

Election campaign officially begins today (Dailies)

"Against decentralization (dailies)

Dailies report that the Vetëvendosja movement has appealed to dissatisfied citizens to join them at a demonstration against decentralization which will take place on Saturday in Gjilan."

16-Oct-09

"UN Security Council discusses Kosovo (dailies)

Dailies report on the United Nations Security Council debate on the recent report of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Kosovo. The report called on all communities to work together so as to normalize the situation in Kosovo. Ban also reported that the EU mission in Kosovo continues to be status neutral, and continues to exchange information and coordinate work with UNMIK."

Mirel to Thaçi: Reforms continue (dailies)

Mirel requests war against corruption and organized crime (dailies)

De Kermabon announces opening of office in the north (dailies)

17-Oct-09

Thaçi and Gruevski sign demarcation agreement (dailies)

"Giffoni officially EU Coordinator for the north (dailies)

Italian Ambassador to Kosovo Michael Giffoni has been officially appointed EU Coordinator for the north of Kosovo"

19-Oct-09

Kosovo and Macedonia establish diplomatic relations (dailies)

21-Oct-09

"Serbia intervenes in Kosovo energy network (dailies)

Dailies report that the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) yesterday disconnected the northern part of Mitrovica."

Russia prefers economy prior to Kosovo (dailies)

Kosovo in 75th place for freedom of media (dailies)

27-Oct-09

"EBU accuses Thaçi for intervention in RTK (dailies)

European Broadcasting Union (EBU) has accused Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi for exerting political and financial pressure on Kosovo Public Broadcaster RTK ahead of local elections. EBU considers that such a development could have a negative impact on Kosovo's international recognitions."

"Kosovo begins advertising in international media (dailies)

The campaign aimed at promoting Kosovo was launched officially yesterday, the papers report. The ads will be broadcasted on BBC, CNN, Euronews and are a product of the Saatchi & Saatchi company. The ads convey the message of a young country with the youngest population in Europe"

30-Oct-09

"Sejdiu: Internationals to blame for situation in the north (dailies)

All dailies cover as one of the leading stories the speech that Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu gave yesterday at the Law Faculty in Pristina. Koha Ditore highlights on the front page Sejdiu's remarks that the international factor is the guarantor of Kosovo's independence and sovereignty, but he also blamed the international factor for the situation in the mainly-Serb northern part of Kosovo."

"EBU insists situation in RTK improves quickly (dailies)

Koha Ditore reports that the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) replied to the invitation by Kosovo Government to come and closely monitor the situation in public broadcaster RTK by saying that the EBU has already sufficient information on the issue."

"Montenegrin police say the board is in Montenegro's territory (dailies)

The director of the Montenegro Police Veselin Veljovic in a meeting with his Kosovo counterpart Sheremet Ahmeti said the board welcoming visitors to Montenegro is inside the country's territory."

4-Nov-09

"EULEX attacks "big fishes" of corruption (dailies)

Dailies report that EULEX chief prosecutor Theo Jackobs announced Tuesday at a roundtable organized by the Kosovo Institute for Democracy, that there will be additional arrests for corruption. Jackobs said investigations are expected to bring results within a few months."

9-Nov-09

"Ahtisaari criticizes Spain and Greece for not recognizing Kosovo (dailies)

"All those countries that wish to be members of the European Union and particularly those from the Balkans should recognize the independence of Kosovo", said Nobel Prize winner Marti Ahtisaari in an interview for Spanish newspaper El Mundo."

Trajkovic: Elections, a crossroads for Kosovo Serbs (dailies)

"Maas: We never asked Serbia to recognize Kosovo (dailies)

Several dailies report that German Ambassador to Belgrade, Wolfram Maas, said that Kosovo and the Netherlands cannot be obstacles to Serbia's integration into the European Union. "Serbia only has an obligation, which I prefer to call a challenge, and that is the completion of all conditions for joining the other EU member states."

10-Nov-09

New Zealand is 63rd country to recognize Kosovo (dailies)

11-Nov-09

Duel between government and opposition on EC progress report (dailies)

"EP delegation to visit Kosovo (dailies)

A seven-member delegation from the European Parliament chaired by the German member of the parliament, Doris Pack, is expected to visit Kosovo during local elections. "

"Feith: Serbs will vote for Albanian candidates (dailies)

Koha Ditore reports that the International Civilian Representative Pieter Feith expressed satisfaction that local Serbs in Gorazhdevc have the will to participate in local elections on Sunday. "I think that there is a will of Serb citizens to vote for some Albanian candidates," said Feith in Peja."

Macedonia nominates Karajanov Ambassador to Kosovo (dailies)

13-Nov-09

ICO and Government committed to open Serbian TV channel (dailies)

16-Nov-09

CEC fails to announce preliminary results after three hours (dailies)

"Serb turnout in local elections (dailies)

In Gracanica, Zëri writes, around 15-18 percent of the population with the right to vote did so by afternoon."

18-Nov-09

"Milliband hails Kosovo elections, mentions irregularities (dailies)

Dailies report that British Foreign Secretary David Milliband has congratulated the people of Kosovo on the first elections after the declaration of independence. "Sunday's elections attracted a good turnout from all Kosovo communities, which is a crucial indication for Kosovo as a strong multiethnic democracy," said Milliband, adding however that one must admit that there have been irregularities."

Rasmussen praises Kosovo elections (dailies)

20-Nov-09

Local elections in two northern Serb municipalities in spring (dailies)

25-Nov-09

"Rohan: Independence irreversible, look to the future (dailies)

Former UN deputy envoy for status of Kosovo, Ambassador Albert Rohan in a solemn speech before the Kosovo Assembly said that independence is an irreversible fact and that Serbia would have to accept it sooner or later."

Results in 15 polling stations across Kosovo annulled (dailies)

Kosovo institutions react against Serbian military base in Bujanovac (dailies)

Healthcare staff refuses vaccines against swine flu (dailies)

1-Dec-09

"National Security Council convenes to discuss situation in Kosovo (dailies)

Papers report that under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, the Kosovo National Security Council met yesterday and discussed the security situation."

3-Dec-09

"Taylor: KSF needs time for military missions in the world (dailies)

During a visit to Kosovo, the United Kingdom's Minister of International Defence and Security Baroness Ann Taylor said that the Kosovo Security Force is making the first steps towards its constitution and as such, needs to undergo several stages until it is fully ready to take part in peacekeeping around the world."

4-Dec-09

"EULEX forbids Bllaca from speaking to media (dailies)

Koha Ditore reports that the international presence is seriously reviewing the allegations made by Nazim Bllaca in his DVD testimony. After winning enough support to stop political interference into the process, the EULEX mission has excluded Kosovo Police and local prosecution from the investigation, and has forbidden Bllaca from communicating with the media."

Crime evidence to be presented to Assembly after run-off elections (dailies)

"EBU encourages prompt amendment of Law on RTK (dailies)

Koha Ditore and Kosova Sot report that the General Director of the European Broadcasting Union, Jean Reveillon, has addressed a letter to Kosovo legislators calling on them to endorse amendments to the Law on RTK as soon as possible, so that the public broadcaster can gain financial sustainability."

7-Dec-09

"No attorney accepts to defend Bllaca in court (dailies)

Dailies report that no attorney has accepted to defend Nazim Bllaca, the self-proclaimed SHIK hit-man, in court. Defense attorneys do not even wish to disclose their reasons for not accepting the case."

8-Dec-09

"Audio recording reveals assassination order for Nazim Bllaca (dailies)

Several dailies report today that an audio recording has been revealed showing that Hysri Rama, a former KPS police officer, received money to assassinate Nazim Bllaca, the self-confessed hitman of the former Kosovo Intelligence Service (SHIK)."

9-Dec-09

European Commission presents study on corruption in Kosovo (dailies)

10-Dec-09

"Stavridis: KFOR troop reduction in January (dailies)

The LDD leader also said that the current ruling coalition has no political will to address the control or management of state borders, when approximately 30 percent of these are not under the control of Kosovo institutions. "

14-Dec-09

PDK wins 10, LDK 5 and AAK 3 municipalities (dailies)

23-Dec-09

Saudi Arabia promises recognitions from other Islamic countries (dailies)

24-Dec-09

"America supports re-voting also in Gjilan (dailies)

Dailies report that the U.S. Ambassador in Kosovo Christopher Dell supported the Central Election Commission (CEC) decision for re-voting in Prizren and Lipjan, and at the same time requested the same standard to be applied in Gjilan Municipality."

29-Dec-09

Prizren, Lipjan re-votes on 31 January, Gjilan date awaited (dailies)